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action would qualify for section 103 1(a) only to the extent that the under-
lying assets would qualify for nonrecognition treatment if the assets
themselves had been exchanged. Whereas the Gufstream rationale would
require gain recognition only in a limited number of instances where the
substance of the transaction does not accurately reflect its form, the aggre-
gate theory approach would be more consistent with congressional policy
and would also limit the abuse of section 1031(a) when partnership inter-
ests are exchanged. Furthermore, the aggregate approach is consistent
with the Service's current treatment of multiple asset exchanges outside the
partnership context.7 Thus, both consistency of results and adherence to
the legislative purpose of section 1031(a) support the adoption of the ag-
gregate theory approach to analyzing an exchange of partnership interests.
III. CONCLUSION
In Gutfstream the Tax Court again rejected the argument that a general
partnership interest is a type of property interest described by the paren-
thetical clause of section 103 1(a). As a result, an exchange of general part-
nership interests may qualify for nonrecognition treatment. The Tax
Court indicated, however, that it will scrutinize the underlying partnership
assets to ensure that section 103 1(a) is not abused when partnership inter-
ests are exchanged. A tax-free exchange of partnership interests will not
be permitted if the underlying partnership assets are predominately stock
in trade held primarily for sale. To implement the policy behind section
1031(a) consistently, however, the Tax Court should expand upon its ra-
tionale in Gulfs/ream by treating the exchange of partnership interests as if
the underlying assets themselves are exchanged, thereby permitting an ex-
change of partnership interests to qualify for section 1031(a) only to the
extent that an exchange of the underlying assets themselves would qualify.
Nathan M. Rosen
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation: Maxey v.
Freightliner Corp.
Billy and Dee Maxey died of burns received when their truck over-
turned and caught fire.' Billy Maxey's parents, individually and as next
71. 2 W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 27, 15.04[3], at 15-32; see
Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225; Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352; Rev. Rul. 57-365,
1957-2 C.B. 521; cf. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) (sale of a business as
a going concern was not treated as a single piece of property representing a capital asset for
income tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1 C.B. 370 (the sale of a going business oper-
ated as a sole proprietorship constitutes the sale of individual assets for gain characterization
purposes).
1. The Maxeys were riding in a large diesel-powered truck. The truck was involved in
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friends of the decedent's surviving children, sued the manufacturer of the
truck, Freightliner Corporation. The Maxeys brought an action in strict
tort liability, contending that the placement of fuel tanks in close proximity
to the cabin and ignition source, without a safety device designed to reduce
the hazard of fire, constituted an unreasonably dangerous design defect.2
The plaintiffs also contended that such a design amounted to gross indif-
ference, justifying an award of punitive damages. The jury found that the
design of the fuel system was unreasonably dangerous, but that Billy
Maxey voluntarily assumed the risk of his injuries. The jury also found
that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the fuel tank was unreasonably dan-
gerous by reason of a lack of adequate warning. The surviving children
received an award of $150,000 actual damages and $10,000,000 punitive
damages based on the jury's finding that the defendant exhibited gross in-
difference in selling the truck as designed. On appeal to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Freightliner Corporation
insisted that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding
that Freightliner acted with an intent that approximated a fixed purpose to
injure. Freightliner also sought denial of any recovery to plaintiffs on the
basis of the jury's finding of an assumption of risk. Freightliner also ar-
gued that in Texas punitive damages are not recoverable in a strict liability
case. Held, affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) the jury's finding of
assumption of risk was unsupported by the evidence; (2) punitive damages
are recoverable in a strict liability cause of action; (3) under the Texas
standard for an award of punitive damages, Freightliner's adherance to a
design common in the industry was a sufficient showing of care to prevent
such an award; and, (4) if, on appeal, the evidence is found to support
punitive damages, the amount awarded by the jury should be sustained.
Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
A. General Standards
A defendant in a products liability case may be liable under any one or
all of three theories of recovery: breach of warranty, negligence, or strict
an accident that caused it to tilt on its side and slide approximately 300 feet. The fire
erupted when the fuel from a ruptured diesel tank ignited after the truck had come to a stop.
2. To determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, it is necessary to weigh
the risk of harm against the utility of the product, considering whether additional safety
devices would unreasonably raise the cost or diminish the utility of the product. Helicoid
Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.). A product can be unreasonably dangerous due to a fail-
ure to warn of defects or a lack of safety devices. See Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800
(Tex. 1975); Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, no writ); Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23
Sw. L.J. 256 (1969). The defective design of a product could be the result of inadequacies in
the plans or specifications or of the choice of materials for the product's composition. De-
sign defects are distinguished from defects in the product that result from careless produc-
tion or manufacture. In other words, although the product may have been manufactured as
specified and planned, the product is defective by reason of its design. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 944-45 (4th ed. 1971).
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tort liability.3 In earlier cases plaintiffs sued on theories of warranty and
negligence.4 Since 1963,' however, strict liability in products cases has be-
come the preferred theory as it requires only that the plaintiff prove that
the product was defective.6
To date, only a handful of reported cases have considered the question
of whether punitive damages may be awarded in a products liability ac-
tion.7 One of the earliest decisions permitting a punitive damage award in
a products liability type of case was Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn,8 decided by
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) outlines the requirements for
strict tort liability:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The Texas Supreme Court adopted § 402A in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d
787, 789 (Tex. 1967). See also Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975), in which
the court emphasized that a finding of negligence is not required; the supplier may be liable
even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.
For a general discussion of strict tort liability, see D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS (1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 2, §§ 96-99; Green, Strict
Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B. A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 1185
(1976); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect,
41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict
Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967).
4. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 97.
5. The first case to deal with the concept of strict tort liability in a products case was
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)
(en banc).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. The terms "exemplary," "punitive," and "vindictive" are used interchangeably in
describing the same type of award for damages. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 236 (1965); see
Riley, Punitive Damages." The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195 (1977-
1978). Punitive damages were first awarded in instances in which the defendant's conduct
was characterized by intent to inflict injury. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 2, at 10-11. The
purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant, deter future tortfeasors, or compen-
sate the plaintiff. See e.g., Courtesy Pontiac, Inc. v. Ragsdale, 532 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1975, writ refd n.r.e.); Credit Plan Corp. v. Gentry, 516 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975);
Lack's Stores, Inc. v. Waisath, 479 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); Belli,
Punitive Damages.- An Historical Perspective, 13 TRIAL, Dec. 1977, at 40; Long, Punitive
Damages.- An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870 (1976). Awards of punitive dam-
ages have been extended from cases involving intentional injuries to cases in which the
defendant's conduct demonstrated a conscious disregard for the safety or interests of others.
Sheffield Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964). An example of such
conscious disregard is the attitude of a manufacturer who knows that injuries will result
from use of his product, but believes that compensating for those injuries would be more
economical than producing a safer product. Comment, Punitive Damages in Products Liabil-
ity Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895, 909 (1976). Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
and Washington do not allow awards of punitive damages. Louisiana provides, however,
for multiple damage awards. Long, supra, at 874.
8. 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 332 (1937).
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the Alabama Supreme Court in 1937. Although the cause of action was
based on fraud and breach of contract, the litigation concerned the sale of
a defective product. The plaintiffs automobile had been damaged by an
inferior grade of motor oil, which the defendant had represented to be
high grade oil. The court upheld a jury verdict for punitive damages based
on the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations. The case was subse-
quently ignored, however, and years passed before another court discussed
punitive damages in products liability cases.
In 1967 a California court of appeals in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc. 9 upheld a punitive damage award. The plaintiff had sued on theories
of negligence and breach of warranty for injuries resulting from the use of
MER/29, a defective drug manufactured by defendant. The evidence
showed that despite the defendant's knowledge of the drug's potential
harmful effects, the defendant had withheld that knowledge from the Fed-
eral Drug Administration, physicians, and the general public. The court
found that this evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding of malice,
which was one standard for awarding punitive damages under a California
statute. 10
In the same year, a Pennsylvania plaintiff also sued Richardson-Merrell,
alleging negligence and fraud for injuries received through the use of
MER/29. " In this case, however, the court reversed an award of punitive
damages because of its concern over the potential for multiple punitive
damage awards since the drug had been distributed to thousands of
users.' 2 The court reasoned that in this instance, the potential of multiple
compensatory damage awards plus the payment of criminal penalties by
the defendant would meet the objectives of deterrence and punishment
that are used to justify awards of punitive damages.' 3 Therefore, the court
subjected the proof to particularly careful scrutiny in determining whether
the New York standard for awarding punitive damages had been met' 4
and concluded that the proof failed.' 5
There is significant authority for allowing punitive damages in products
liability cases involving proof of wanton, willful, or reckless disregard of
9. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
10. 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or im-
plied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
II. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 P.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
12. Over 1000 personal injury claims were filed against the manufacturer of MER/29.
Although many plaintiffs sought punitive damages, only Toole resulted in a punitive dam-
age award. For economic reasons and expediency, Richardson-Merrell settled as many
claims as pssible out of court. Comment, supra note 7, at 921.
13. 378 F.2d at 841; see note 7 supra.
14. 378 F.2d at 842. The parties stipulated that New York law was to be applied. Id. at
834 n.I. Under New York law, the recklessness that will give rise to punitive damages must
be close to criminality and, like criminal conduct, such recklessness must be clearly estab-
lished. Id at 843.
15. Id. at 850.
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an individual's rights.' 6 In Drake v. Wham-O Manufacturing Co. 17 the
plaintiff brought suit in negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty
for fatal injuries received by plaintiff's husband while using a recreational
product manufactured by the defendant. The defendant entered a motion
to dismiss, arguing inter alia that punitive damages should not be allowed
in products liability actions based primarily on strict liability in tort. Puni-
tive damages, the defendant urged, are available only for torts based on
intent. The court rejected this argument, noting that the plaintiff could
simply make a supplemental showing of aggravated conduct to establish
entitlement to punitive damages.' 8 The court concluded that in Wisconsin
the availability of punitive damages is tied to the facts proved rather than
the formal theory of recovery alleged.' 9 The court accordingly denied the
motion to dismiss the claim for punitive damages.
In Vollert v. Summa Corp. 20 the plaintiff had commenced suit based on
breach of warranty, negligence, and strict tort liability for personal injuries
suffered in a helicopter accident. The defendant, citing Roginsky v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc. 21 argued that punitive damages should not be al-
lowed in a products liability case. The court disagreed, stating that
nothing in Hawaii law prohibited an award of punitive damages in a prod-
ucts liability cause of action.22 Moreover, the court distinguished Rogin-
sky because the defendant in Vollert failed to identify any pending suits
against it connected with the acts alleged by the plaintiff.23 The court
noted that "[ilt would require a substantial change in the law to hold that
simply because there might be other suits filed against defendant, punitive
damages should not be allowed."24
The reported cases dealing with the availability of punitive damages in
products liability litigation uniformly hold that punitive damages are
available, provided the plaintiff sustains the requisite standard of proof.25
16. See Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 273 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Toole v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co.,
116 I11. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 I11. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970);
Hafner v. Guerlain, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 162, 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1970).
17. 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
18. Id at 611.
19. Id
20. 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975).
21. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); see notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
22. 389 F. Supp. at 1351.
23. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
24. 389 F. Supp. at 1351 (emphasis in original).
25. The following cases uphold either the trial court's submission of a punitive damages
issue to the jury or the jury's award of punitive damages. In some of the cases, however,
appellate courts later found that the evidence was insufficient to support the punitive dam-
age award. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 109 (6th Cir. 1975) (evidence
permitted inferrence of malice; punitive damages award upheld); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 145-47 (3d Cir. 1973) (failure to submit issue of punitive damages to jury
required new trial), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Mak-
ers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (evidence insufficient to support award of
punitive damages); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 462-63, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 416, 424 (1974) (because of error in jury instruction, punitive damages not recoverable
by representatives or heirs of deceased occupants of a plane that crashed); Barth v. B.F.
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Although certain commentators have argued against recovery of punitive
damages, 26 most commentators agree that there is no justification for the
argument that a punitive damage claim is theoretically inconsistent with a
strict liability cause of action. Most commentators also disagree with the
argument advanced by manufacturers that punitive damage recoveries
should not be available when multiple plaintiffs are involved.28
In Texas, the availability of punitive damages in strict liability cases re-
mains an open question. 29 In Hell Co. v. Grant,3° however, the Tyler court
of civil appeals recently noted in a dictum that, because of the mandate of
the Texas Constitution,31 exemplary damages may be recovered in a strict
liability action if the injury attributable to the defective product results in
the death of the user.3 2 The court did not explain its reasoning beyond
quoting the constitutional provision and noting that punitive damages
have been allowed in products liability actions in other jurisdictions.33
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 (1968) (punitive damages
amendment to plaintiffs' cause of action upheld); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d
109, 253 N.E.2d 636, 648 (1969) (evidence of willful and wanton conduct supported award of
punitive damages), aff'd, 46 I11. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co.,
567 S.W.2d 655, 667 (Mo. App. 1978) (punitive damages award upheld in products liability
case).
26. Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages.* An Annotated Argumentative Outline,
11 FORUM 57 (1975); Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases
Should Not Be Allowed, 1978 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 46; Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's
Liabilityfor Design and Punitive Damages-The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 595 (1974); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INs. COUNSEL
J. 300 (1972); Comment, supra note 7.
27. Abramson, Punitive Damages in Aircraft Accident Cases-A Debate, II FORUM 50
(1975); Igoe, Punitive Damages-An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL, Nov. 1978, at 48;
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257 (1976);
Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 116 (1968); Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in the Products Case, 15
TRIAL, Jan. 1979, at 34; Comment, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Claims, 6 GA. L. REV. 613 (1972). One commentator has pointed out that punitive damages
have been awarded in the following cases involving strict liability concepts: nuisance, tres-
pass to land, liability for ultrahazardous activities, negligence per se, defamation, and breach
of an implied warranty. Owen, supra, at 1270.
28. See authorities cited in note 27 supra. But see Riley, supra note 7, at 252, in which
the author argues in favor of limiting the availability of punitive damage awards in a situa-
tion where there are multiple plaintiffs.
29. Maxey v. Freightlmer Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
30. 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Hell the decedent
was killed when he was trapped on a dump truck due to the failure of an hydraulic hoist
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged strict liability, defective designs, and
failure to warn. See also Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973), in
which the court affirmed the denial of a claim for punitive damages in an action alleging
strict liability for design defects because there was insufficient evidence of defendant's con-
scious indifference to the public. The court thereby implied that punitive damages are re-
coverable in Texas in a strict liability action.
31. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 26 provides: "Every person, corporation, or company, that
may commit a homicide, through wilful act, or omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsi-
ble, in exemplary damages, to the surviving husband, widow, heirs . . . without regard to
any criminal proceeding that may or may not be had in relation to the homicide."
32. 534 S.W.2d at 926.
33. Id
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B. The Texas Standardfor Punitive Damages
The general standard that a plaintiff must meet in order to recover puni-
tive damages was announced by the Texas Supreme Court in Sheffield Di-
vision, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones:3
4
"In order that a recovery of exemplary damages may be sustained,
the plaintiff must show, not merely that the defendant could have or
ought to have foreseen and prevented the loss . . . but that he acted
intentionally or wilfully, or with a degree of 'gross negligence' which
approximates a fixed purpose to bring about the injury of which the
plaintiff complains.
The court defined gross negligence as "that entire want of care which
would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result
of a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the person or persons to
be affected by it.",
36
Although the Texas courts uniformly pay homage to the Sheffield test,
quoting "conscious indifference," ".fixed purpose," and "entire want of
care" as the necessary elements for recovery of damages, 37 in practice the
courts have not always accurately applied this test to the evidence
presented.38 Instead, they have allowed the question of punitive damages
to reach the jury when the facts have presented a question as to whether
34. 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964). The test announced in Sheield was first enunciated in
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Shuford, 72 Tex. 165, 10 S.W. 408 (1888). In Missouri Pacfic the court
defined gross negligence as a total want of ordinary care. Earlier, in Southern Cotton Press
& Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587, 600 (1880), the Court stated that gross negligence
amounted to an entire want of care, raising a presumption of a conscious indifference to
consequences. The court in Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1977), indicated
that under Texas law conscious indifference to the welfare of others amounting to gross
negligence does not exist if a defendant exercises even slight care.
35. 376 S.W.2d at 828.
36. Id (emphasis in original) (quoting Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Shuford, 72 Tex. 165, 10
S.W. 408 (1888)).
37. See, e.g., Helms v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 202 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 1953)
(mere indifference by the employer in providing safety devices is insufficient to show a con-
scious indifference to the rights of others); Gaut v. Quast, 5 10 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. 1974) (doc-
tor's failure to obtain patient's informed consent was insufficient to justify punitive damages
absent a finding of intentional misrepresentation); Ogle v. Craig, 464 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1971)
(charge to the jury indicating that a requirement of bad faith or wilfulness was needed held
to be reversible error); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Alvarez, 453 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1970) (proof
of unlawful or wilful act, absent a showing of malice, is insufficient to support punitive
damages); Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1969) (required a showing of actual
malice, defined as ill will and intent to injure); Christopher v. General Computer Sys., Inc.,
560 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (punitive damages allowed
because evidence showed a deliberate diversion of funds); Briscoe v. Laminack Tire Serv.,
Inc., 546 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (punitive damages
award reversed because there was no showing of wilfulness in the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion); Courtesy Pontiac, Inc. v. Ragsdale, 532 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (defined malice as knowingly converting another's property and intentional
wrongdoing); Roy Gladen Buick, Inc. v. Sterling, 524 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (fraud must be committed intentionally); Stephens v. Dunn, 417
S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ) (employer's exercise of some care will
prevent a finding of gross negligence).
38. See Harbin v. Scale, 461 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1970). Following evidence showing that
the defendant was speeding at 80 miles per hour, the court did not require a showing of
conscious intent but only of a reckless disregard of others.
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the defendant had shown care in his actions. For example, in Hood Y.
Phillos39 the court allowed a special issue on punitive damages although
the defendant doctor exercised considerable care in employing a highly
controversial medical procedure. In Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. An-
derson4° the jury's award of exemplary damages was upheld where evi-
dence was introduced showing that defendant had failed to exercise
reasonable care in reducing the level of pollution causing damage to plain-
tifis property.
II. MAXEY V. FREIGHTLINER CORP.
The district court in Maxey v. Freightliner Corp. addressed the questions
of whether exemplary damages are available in a strict liability cause of
action4 ' and, if so, what the Texas standard is for awarding exemplary
damages.42 The court noted that the availability of exemplary damages in
a strict liability cause of action is an open question in Texas.43 Since the
dictum in Heil Co. v. Grant" is not binding, the court proceeded under
the Erie doctrine45 to predict the future course of Texas decisions.46
Freightliner's argument that a no-fault strict liability claim is conceptually
incompatible with a fault-based claim for exemplary damages was unper-
suasive to the court. The court reasoned that the concepts underlying the
39. 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
40. 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
41. 450 F. Supp. at 961. The court also considered and set aside the jury's finding that
Billy Maxey voluntarily assumed the risk of his injuries. The court found insufficient evi-
dence to establish that Billy Maxey had the requisite knowledge of the specific defect and
the subjective appreciation of the risk of danger created by the defect. Furthermore, even if
Billy had possessed such knowledge, it could not be imputed to his wife because the test
requires a subjective voluntary assumption of a known risk. Id at 960 (citing Massman-
Johnson v. Gundolf, 484 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1972)). See also Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975);
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974); Rabb v. Coleman, 469 S.W.2d
384, 387 (Tex. 1971); Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tex. 1966); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534
S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. 450 F. Supp. at 963. The court also discussed whether the exemplary damage award
was excessive. Stating that it was not bound by Texas law in passing on this question, the
court nevertheless looked to previous Texas decisions for guidance. It concluded that Texas
juries have never been required to adhere to a strict ratio between actual and exemplary
damages. Rather, a jury must look at a variety of factors, including the degree of outrage
produced by the evil, the frequency of the evil, and what amount of recovery would deter
similar evil in the future. Choosing not to substitute its judgment for that of the jury, the
court found that the amount of the award was not excessive since it was within the range
allowed by substantive law and was not the product of passion or prejudice. Id at 964-66.
See also Gibson Discount Center, Inc. v. Cruz, 562 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
43. 450 F. Supp. at 961.
44. 534 S.W.2d 916, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see text accom-
panying notes 31-32 supra.
45. The Erie doctrine, enunciated in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), re-
qeuires that, except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
ederal courts in diversity of citizenship actions should apply state law regardless of whether
such law is embodied in a statute or promulgated in a state court decision. If the state laws
are silent on the legal question at issue in the federal court, the court's duty is to predict how
the state courts will hold when faced with the issue.
46. 450 F. Supp. at 961.
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two claims are independent, with the purpose of the former to compensate
and the latter to deter. The issue therefore was whether two theories of
recovery can be joined in a single suit.47 The court noted that the risk of
infecting a no-fault concept by simultaneous pursuit of a fault-based claim
was exaggerated; the language of strict liability is itself pregnant with fault
connotations." The court concluded that "simultaneous pursuit of actual
damages bottomed on principles of strict liability and exemplary damages
bottomed on fault concepts are essentially matters of trial efficiency and
presents no true substantive issues."'49
The court was also unpersuaded that potential financial devastation re-
sulting from multiple punitive damage awards constituted sufficient
grounds to deny punitive damages." Instead, the court stated that the haz-
ard of "deterrence slipping into destruction" could be prevented by a strict
application of Texas requirements of proof.5 Of course, if the manufac-
turer's conduct had indeed been callous, there might be a more lax appli-
cation of the Texas requirements of proof.
5 2
In concluding that punitive damages could be allowed in a strict liability
cause of action, the court was influenced by article XVI, section 26 of the
Texas Constitution.5 3 The court stated, without further explanation, that it
was unsure how Texas courts could bar recovery of punitive damages de-
spite actual damages being based on a strict liability theory. 4 Evidently,
the district court interpreted the provision as requiring punitive damages
regardless of the underlying theory of recovery provided a homicide had
been caused by the defendant's "wilful act, or omission, or gross ne-
glect."55
To determine the Texas standard for an award of exemplary damages,
the district court looked to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Sheield
Division, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones.56 This standard contemplates either
47. Id An affirmative answer seemed self-evident to the court. Certainly the presenta-
tion of a single claim based on different theories was not novel. The federal rules of civil
procedure, for example, allow such a procedure. Id; see FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
48. 450 F. Supp. at 962.
49. Id
50. Id; see notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
51. 450 F. Supp. at 963.
52. For a list of factors that should be considered by the court in awarding punitive
damages in order to exercise judicial control over excessive awards, see Owen, supra note 27,
at 1319-25.
53. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
54. 450 F. Supp. at 963.
55. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 26; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon
1967), which states that the workers' compensation statute does not prevent recovery of ex-
emplary damages. See also Nations, Recovery of Exemplary Damages Under the Texas
Workers'Compensation Act, 19 S. TEX. L.J. 431 (1978). But see Jones v. Ross, 141 Tex. 415,
419, 173 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (1943), in which the court, in interpreting the constitutional
provision, held that exemplary damages are only available in those classes of exemplary
damage cases that were in existence at the time the constitutional provision was adopted.
56. 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964). Plaintiffs argued that something less than a showing of
intent to injure is required. In support of the trial court's requirement of strict proof as a
safety measure to prevent the defendant's financial destruction as a result of multiple expo-
sure, however, one could argue that requiring proof of intent to injure provides a reliable
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an intentional act or an act with a degree of gross negligence that approxi-
mated a fixed purpose to bring about an injury.57 The plaintiffs argued
that they had presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of con-
scious indifference or a complete absence of care on the part of the defend-
ant." Plaintiffs' evidence purported to show that Freightliner had never
tested the fuel system in a crash environment before marketing it, had
never crash tested even one of its trucks nor considered doing so, and had
not kept records on the incidents of fire or injury involving their trucks. 9
Notwithstanding the above evidence, the court concluded that the defend-
ant had shown a sufficient concern for safety by adopting a design "com-
mon to all manufacturers and millions of vehicles for over thirty years."60
The court conceded that an entire industry can be inattentive and at fault.
The critical question was, however, whether the entire industry was acting
intentionally or was so grossly negligent as to approximate a fixed purpose
to bring about an injury.6 With the question thus stated, the court held
that Freightliner's conduct did not meet the requirements for an award of
punitive damages under the Sheffield standard.62
The court suggested that adopting a design common to the industry
might not shield a defendant in subsequent cases from liability for punitive
damages, depending on the industry's response to any accumulated evi-
dence of defects.6 3 Waiting for evidence of defects to accumulate before a
defendant can be disciplined by punitive damages, however, is to allow
unnecessary injuries to occur. Instead, sufficient evidence of a flagrant dis-
regard for the public safety may be shown by the failure of a manufacturer
to test the safety of the adopted design, or at least verify that other manu-
facturers have done so.'
standard by which to judge whether punitive damages are deserved. Comment, supra note
7, at 908.
57. 376 S.W.2d at 828.
58. 450 F. Supp. at 963.
59. Id
60. Id at 964.
61. Id
62. Id. at 963.
63. Id at 966.
64. See Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636, 649 (1969), af'd,
46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970); Owen, supra note 27, at 1342.
The plaintiffs in Maxey P. Freightliner Corp. have appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals alleging inter alia that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Texas standard for
awarding punitive damages. When previously faced with cases involving an award of puni-
tive damages, the Fifth Circuit has =oked to Sheffield as the applicable Texas standard.
See, e.g., Ballenger v. Mobil Oil Corp., 488 F.2d 707, 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
986 (1974); Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973); Wooley v. South-
western Portland Cement Co., 272 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1959). Most jurisdictions have adopted
a strict requirement of intent to injure analogous to the Texas standard. For comparisons,
see Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1973); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers,
Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App.
1978). But see d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977) (reckless
indifference sufficient to award punitive damages); Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102
(6th Cir. 1975) (no intent necessary, only a reckless disregard for the rights of others), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1967) (deliberate intent not necessary).
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III. CONCLUSION
In Maxey v. Freightliner Corp. the district court determined that punitive
damages, which are based on fault concepts, are recoverable in Texas in a
suit in which the actual damages are based on no-fault strict liability. The
court denied a recovery of punitive damages, however, based on its finding
that the defendant had exhibited sufficient care by adopting a design uti-
lized by all truck manufacturers for over thirty years. The court relied on
the standard for exemplary damages set forth in Sheffield Division, Armco
Steel Corp. v. Jones, interpreting Sheield as meaning that the slightest
showing of care precludes a jury question on exemplary damages. If this
strict interpretation is correct, then the issue to be resolved is whether the
defendant's compliance with industry custom amounted to some evidence
of care. The adoption of a design common to the industry should not be
sufficient in itself to preclude an award of exemplary damages. Failure to
test a potentially hazardous product or to verify such testing may consti-
tute conscious indifference to the welfare of consumers and should be suffi-
cient evidence to send the question of punitive damages to the jury.
Mary Burdin
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